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ABSTRACT 
 
The interplay between speculative levels in futures contracts and prospective price changes is an 
important issue for hedgers, speculators, consumers, and regulators. The Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) began the dissemination of disaggregated data in September 2009; 
which allows for additional analysis that was previously not possible. This study analyzes 
Disaggregated Commitments of Traders data and prospective price effects in underlying futures 
markets. The relationship between position changes and subsequent price movements is examined 
through a series of Granger causality tests in agricultural commodity, energy, and metal markets. 
Primary findings indicate large traders and hedgers have more influence in future price changes 
in some commodity markets. In addition, there is limited evidence that changes in the positions of 
swap dealers and producers can cause subsequent futures prices to change, although the effect is 
inconsistent across time.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
here is frequent speculation in academia and the media seeking to explain the sharp increases in 
many commodity prices during the period 2005 through 2008. In its final issue of 2009, “Investment 
Outlook –America in 2010,” Business Week presents speculation in the commodity market as one of 
five “financial fixes” following the recession. Regulators wanting to curb speculation have also issued new 
guidelines for trading commodity-based derivatives on the major exchanges in the United States. 
 
The Commitments of Trader (COT) data provides the opportunity to examine positions of large speculators 
and hedgers in the commodity futures market on a weekly basis. Traders in the futures markets might see this as an 
opportunity to acquire additional information that can help them predict the direction of the underlying market or 
gain insights into trading strategies. The dissemination of the positions of more informed traders therefore could be 
useful in explaining past and future price movements in primary futures markets. 
 
This study includes five contracts trading on U.S. Commodity Futures Exchanges. Corn, Natural Gas, 
Copper, Live Cattle, and Coffee were selected based on data availability and market size. In viewing these futures 
markets, the study includes both commodities related to agriculture and those related to energy and basic materials. 
The development in prices over the time span examined is very different across the sample set. Natural Gas, Corn, 
and Copper futures prices all spiked between 2006 and 2008, while neither Coffee nor Live Cattle had a comparable 
increase in price. Casual observation suggests that one explanation might be that Coffee and Live Cattle were not 
exposed to the high level of speculation observed in Natural Gas, Corn, and Copper markets. However, the open 
interest and trading volume experienced extraordinary growth over the same period for all of these commodities, 
except for the Copper futures market. 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
1382 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIVE COMMODITIES APPEARS BELOW: 
 
Corn (Chicago Board of Trade, CBOT) 
 
The futures contract for corn at CBOT is set at 5,000 bushels per contract, with the specification that 
delivery be graded #2 Yellow. This particular grade establishes a minimum bushel weight and maximum limits on 
damaged and broken kernels. Corn trades in March, May, July, September, and December. The speculative limit set 
by the CFTC for corn was 22,000 contracts for all months. By comparison, the average daily volume for all corn 
contracts over the last three years was approximately 270,000 contracts. 
 
Natural Gas (New York Mercantile Exchange, NYMEX) 
 
This contract specifies delivery at the Henri Hub in Louisiana and a contract size of 10,000 million British 
thermal units (mmBtu). Monthly contracts are available 12 years in advance, although nearly all open interest is 
concentrated over the first two years. The speculative limit for Natural Gas is set at 12,000 contracts, as compared to 
an average of 154,000 contracts traded daily in the last three years. 
 
Copper—Grade #1 (Commodity Exchange Inc., COMEX) 
 
The contract size for copper is set at 25,000 pounds per contract. Copper contracts are available for every 
calendar month, 23 months in advance. Copper deliveries must be Grade 1 Electrolytic Copper Cathodes (full plate 
or cut) and conform to minimum purity levels. The speculative limit of copper is 5,000 contracts and average daily 
volume over the last three years in the sample is approximately 20,000 contracts. 
 
Live Cattle (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, CME) 
 
Live Cattle futures have a size of 40,000 pounds per contract. The product description is 55 percent Choice, 
45 percent Select, Yield Grade 3 live steers. Live Cattle futures are delivered every year in February, April, June, 
August, October, and December. CBOT sets the limit at trading 5,400 Live Cattle futures in any contract month. By 
contrast, the daily number of contracts traded over the last three years in the sample averaged approximately 36,000. 
 
Coffee “C” (Intercontinental Exchange, ICE) 
 
The contract size for coffee is 37,000 pounds per contract. Physical delivery requires Arabica beans in the 
months of March, May, July, September, and December contracts. The Exchange sets a limit of 5,000 contracts. The 
average daily volume of coffee contracts was approximately 15,000 through the sample period. 
 
The present study seeks to add to the body of literature on COT data, trading strategies, and the role of 
speculation on futures prices. It is widely known that individuals and automated algorithms use COT data in the 
formulation of trading strategies and signals. Floyd Upperman points out in Commitments of Traders (p. 2) that 
“Indicators derived from (the COT data) can provide traders with a unique perspective that is unobtainable through 
traditional price-derived methods.” Although the extent to which speculation in the futures markets causes prices to 
diverge from fundamental values will remain unsettled, the immediate analysis will help the discussion by 
considering the possibility of predictable price movements caused by changes in the positions of major speculators, 
hedgers, and swap dealers. 
 
CFTC and the Large Reporting System 
 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was created by Congress in 1974 as an independent 
agency of the federal government to administer the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Prior to the establishment of 
the CFTC, the CEA was administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The role of the CFTC includes 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over commodities futures and futures options markets in the United States. One of the 
commission’s primary functions is to protect the market from manipulation, abusive trade practices, and fraud. The 
CFTC also has regulatory oversight of futures exchanges, futures clearinghouses, and other self-regulatory 
exchanges such as NFA. 
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Large Reporting System 
 
The base for CFTC’s surveillance program is the large-trader reporting system. The reporter system 
collects position-level data from large traders who own or control a relatively large position in a U.S. futures market 
that is greater than a minimum level set by the CFTC. The level at which a trader has to report to the CFTC 
obviously differs across commodities. The data is released periodically and compiled into reports that are used to 
monitor the largest positions of the largest players across a variety of futures markets. The Commitments of Traders 
(COT) reports date back to 1924, a time when the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Grain Futures Administration 
published its first comprehensive annual report of hedging and speculation in regulated futures markets. The reports 
have become more frequent over time and since 2000, reports have been released weekly on the CFTC website. 
 
In the original report, the trader categories were divided into three groups: 
 
 Commercial: Simply, if the trader uses futures contracts in that particular commodity for hedging, the 
trader falls under the commercial category. A “hedger” is further defined by CFTC: 
 Non-commercial: Engages in speculation and not in hedging. 
 Non-reporting: Non-reportable positions are total open interest, excluding that part of the open interest 
reported to CFTC. A trader in this category may thus engage in hedging or speculating activities. This 
group is frequently referred to as the “small speculator” category. 
 
The data for the report is collected every Tuesday and released on the following Friday at 3:30 p.m. 
Standard Eastern Time. 
 
Disaggregated Commitment of Trader Data 
 
The disaggregated data was first available to the public on October 20, 2009. Therefore, a very limited 
number of papers have used the dataset. The data covers a total of 21 commodities over the last three-and-a-half 
years. The disaggregated Commitments of Traders is a more detailed breakdown of the categories of large traders. 
The “old” classification in the aggregated reports includes only a commercial and a non-commercial category. The 
disaggregated report expands this classification, dividing traders into swap dealers, producers, and money managers. 
In the aggregate report, the commercial category included swap dealers. Technically, swap dealers are hedging, 
since they are hedging with swaps through the futures market, but disaggregation makes a clearer distinction 
between the main classifications of traders. Before starting on the analysis of the different groups of traders, a brief 
explanation of each category in the recently released data is in order: 
 
 Producer/Merchant/Processor/User: Under this category are mainly entities that produce, process, pack, or 
handle a physical commodity, and use the futures market to hedge against risk. 
 Swap Dealer: This entity mainly deals in swap transactions as a form of hedging risks. The swap dealer’s 
counterparts can be speculative traders in hedge funds or traditional commercial clients that manage risk 
arising from their dealings in physical commodities. 
 Money Manager: Money managers engage in managing and conducting organized futures trading on behalf 
of clients where positions are larger than the reportable limit set by the CFTC. In other words, this group 
consists of a category that may be termed “large speculators.” 
 Non-Reportable: The “non-reportable” category is similar to the non-reportable category for the aggregate 
data; i.e., open interest with the exclusion of that portion reported to the CFTC. 
 
Literature Review 
 
A good deal of research has been devoted to the relationship between COT data and futures prices for 
various commodity futures, with most studies seeking evidence that high levels of speculation in different markets 
can cause prices of certain commodities to rise or fall to unsustainable or destabilizing levels. Although speculation 
in the futures market has been sharply criticized, especially after the spike in commodities prices in 2005–2008, 
there is little evidence supporting the ability of any category of traders to move the market in this period. Academics 
seem to have reached mixed conclusions as to whether the COT data provides any additional information for the 
traders. 
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Hartzmark (1991) looks at the performance of individual futures traders, using unique end-of-the day 
Commitments of Traders data from CFTC to investigate and analyze the forecasting abilities of over 2,000 
individual traders. Hartzmark’s methods, as applied to several agricultural and financial futures markets, reveal that 
the returns to traders of futures are randomly generated. In other words, the article argues that the high positive 
returns of individual futures traders are determined by luck, as opposed to forecast ability. The study notes, however, 
that commercial traders show slightly better forecasting abilities than non-commercial traders, and relates this to the 
fact that the commercial category has access to the most timely data that might prove advantageous in predicting 
returns. Several articles also make the point that all the studies up until 1991 conclude that the small traders are the 
big losers and the large traders are the big winners (Stewart, 1949; Houthakker, 1957; Rockwell, 1964, 1977; 
Hartzmark, 1984, 1987). Leuthold as well as Garcia and Lu (1994) look at relatively similar Commitments of Trader 
data for trying to predict prices in the Frozen Pork Bellies Futures Market a few years later. This study, however, 
mainly looks at the speculators’ (non-commercial) returns. The authors had access to daily Commitments of Trader 
data from CFTC, and had 450,000 daily trading observations for 3,171 traders between 1982 and 1990. In this way, 
the researchers acquired a very detailed picture of what was occurring on a day-to-day basis, and did not have to 
work with the weekly public data. The study interestingly concludes that large reporting traders generate significant 
profits and that the distribution over time is non-random, compared to Hartzmark’s finding that the return 
distribution overall was random. The paper also posits that “a subset of large elite traders possesses significant 
forecasting ability, indicating that they not only are able to consistently anticipate the direction of price changes but 
are also on the right side of the market when large price changes occur.” 
 
Another study, by Ederington and Lee (2002), investigates the 223 largest traders in the heating oil futures 
market, and questions whether the “commercial” group in the COT report can be classified as hedgers. The authors 
obtained access to the daily positions from the Commitments of Traders data between 1993 and 1997 and were able 
to break the group down into 11 subcategories, including refiners and commercial banks (for commercials/hedgers) 
and floor traders and energy traders (for non-commercial/speculators). The study finds that the traders’ approaches 
are significantly different, depending upon whether they take long or short positions. An additional finding is that, 
while the large trader non-commercial category seems to comprise speculators, many traders in the commercial 
group seem to be speculating as well. For example, both refiners and commercial and investment banks (classified 
as commercials in the Heating Oil futures market) appear to engage in speculation. 
 
Sanders, Irwin, and Mirrin (2008) is one of the papers using the public Commitments of Traders data to 
determine whether large traders who report positions to CFTC can forecast price or returns. The authors investigate 
agricultural commodities, including Corn and Live Cattle, but find little evidence that the traders’ positions from the 
COT data are useful for forecasting market return. Weak evidence is found that commercial (hedgers’) positions 
lead returns in a few specific markets. However, the authors find that positions follow returns, and that especially the 
non-reporting category consists of “trend followers.” These findings are supported by other research. 
 
For the energy futures market, a study by Sanders, Boris, and Manfredo (2004) addresses the same topic, 
looking at the Commitments of Traders data’s ability to forecast returns after the release of the data. The authors 
examine the COT data for commodities such as crude oil, unleaded gasoline, heating oil, and natural gas futures 
contracts between 1992 and 1999. For the analysis, they use Granger causality tests for a linear regression to test 
causal relationships. The results are similar in agriculture commodities, in that price changes cause the different 
categories to change their positions. According to the study, the non-commercial categories increase their positions 
in a rising market, while commercials decrease their positions in a decreasing market. The study does not find any 
evidence that traders’ PNL positions contain any general predictive information about market returns. The PNL 
position is the net position for the category divided by the sum of the short and long. 
 
Several studies have analyzed commodities using price return and COT data. Wang (2003) surveys a total 
of 15 futures markets in the United States, including not only commodity futures, but also currency and S&P 500 
futures. The paper examines performance for the commercial and non-commercial categories in these markets, as 
well as the determinants of trading decisions. Wang (2003) supports other research which has found that 
commercials tend to trade against the market, while non-commercials tend to trade with the market. However, 
Wang’s study found that over intervals from 1 to 12 weeks, non-commercial traders’ positions forecast price 
continuations and commercial traders forecast price reversals. The paper also uses the findings of negative 
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correlation between performance of speculators and hedgers as evidence of hedging pressure
1
 existing in the futures 
market. In addition, the study finds that speculators are superior in timing the trading. 
 
A study by Gurrib (2007) uses the Commitments of Traders data to examine how different trading 
categories react to major economic events in the 1990s. These events include the Asian crisis in 1997 and the 
Russian bond crisis about a year later. Gurrib (2007) covers 29 U.S. futures markets without going into detail about 
each market and concludes that informed players in the commodities markets were hardly affected by these events. 
The relationship between risk and return was stable over the period of the study. 
 
Gurrib’s second topic focused on whether the speculative level of various commodity futures could affect 
prices. In agricultural commodities, Peck (1981) observes the influence of speculators on the futures market for 
Wheat, Corn, and Soy Beans between 1964 and 1977. The paper uses Working’s Speculative Index, introduced later 
in this paper, to investigate the speculative level in these commodities futures markets. Peck considers the 
significant growth in the agricultural futures markets, a phenomenon comparable to many commodity futures 
markets today. His research shows that speculation has declined significantly in the Corn and Soy Bean markets 
through this period. It is noteworthy that later in the same decade, the Soy Bean futures market was the one to 
experience extensive manipulation from the Italian firm Ferruzzi
2
 (at that time classified as a hedger). 
 
Sanders, Irwin, and Mirrin (2008) examine the changes in the different categories over time for several 
agricultural commodities, but does not go into testing relationships between price changes and changes in holdings 
by these categories. However, the paper is nevertheless interesting because it provides research from six decades 
measuring Working’s Speculative Index, which can be compared to the speculative index from the same commodity 
today. The paper also looks at the two other reports that CFTC provides for evaluating the level of speculation in the 
market. One of these, the Commodity Index Traders Report (CIT), breaks down the index traders for 12 agricultural 
markets. The second, the Bank Participation in Futures Market Report (BP), contains the positions that commercial 
banks hold in futures markets with at least five banks in open positions. At the end of the paper, the authors note that 
the last time the commodity markets went through a structural change, in the mid-1970s, the speculators were also 
blamed for price increases. Chiarella and Röthig (2007) is another relatively recent article concerning speculation in 
various futures markets. The paper analyzes nonlinear speculation in the commodity futures market for Cattle, Corn, 
and Hog futures and concludes by rejecting linearity for all markets in the study. 
 
The only article using the disaggregated data to focus on the net positions of different categories is by 
Hillary Till at the EDHEC-Risk Institute in France. The study looks at Working’s Speculative Index for the 
disaggregated data in the Crude Oil futures market. By simply graphing the speculative index for market participants 
in the Crude Oil futures market, Till reaches the conclusion that the level of speculation in the oil futures market is 
not “excessive.” 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This paper uses two sets of data for the analysis. One set of data comes from the Weekly COT 
(Commitments of Traders) Report, containing weekly observations on futures from 1995–2009 (a total of 778 
observations). The main part of the paper uses data from the more detailed Disaggregated Commitments of Traders 
Report (Disaggregated COT), which was published by the CFTC in the fall of 2009. The observations are also 
weekly, starting with June 13 in 2006, and conducted to the end of 2009 (187 observations). 
 
This paper uses Holbrook Working’s Speculative Index. Working was one of the pioneers in research on 
the futures markets and is quoted as “the great theorist of futures markets.”3 The index was based on Commitments 
                                                          
1 “To transfer nonmarketable risks, hedgers are required to pay a significant premium to speculators for risk-bearing services, 
which is usually termed the “hedging pressure effect.” (Wang, 2003) 
2 The manipulation scandal by Ferruzzi resulted in giant lawsuits and fines. See p. 22 in Futures, options, and swaps, Robert W. 
Kolb, James A. Overdahl, (2007) 
3 See Robert Schiller, ECON 252: Financial Markets (Spring, 2008), Lecture 22, http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/financial-
markets/ 
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of Traders data and set to measure the adequacy of speculative positions to balance the hedging positions held by 
commercial traders. Working’s Speculative Index (also called Working’s T Index), is calculated as: 
 
HSHL
HSHL
SL
T
HLHS
HSHL
SS
T






 if 1
or
 if 1
 
 
where: T= Working’s Speculative Index, SS = Speculator short, SL = Speculator long, HL = Hedger long, and HS = 
Hedger short 
 
The denominator shows the total open interest from hedge positions. If the amount of short hedging is 
greater than the amount of long hedging, speculative longs are needed to balance the market and technically, 
speculative shorts are not required by hedgers. Any surplus of speculative short positions would need to be balanced 
by additional speculative long positions. The Speculative Index measures excess speculative positions beyond what 
are technically required to balance commercial needs. This excess is measured relative to commercial open interest. 
Sanders, Irwin, and Mirrin (2008) are among the articles that examine the Speculative Index. The paper also 
compares current levels of the index for a few agricultural commodities with former research using this Speculative 
Index. The study found that “after adjusting speculative indices for index fund positions, values are within the 
historical ranges reported in prior research” dating back to 1960. Over time, these values have ranged between 1.15 
and 1.65. In this paper, the speculative index is calculated for a total of 10 relatively large commodity futures 
markets between 1995 and 2009 (graph 2.1), including the five commodities discussed. 
 
Several papers (e.g., Leuthold, 1983; Sanders, 2008) have noted the obvious problem that one does not 
know how to specify non-reporting traders when calculating the Speculative Index. This could be significant and 
should be kept in mind when studying this index. For the commodities in this analysis, Soy Beans, Live Cattle, and 
Corn have the highest percentage of non-reporting traders relative to total open interest (non-commercial corn short 
around 25 percent of the total open interest). 
 
To determine the correlations between the different categories and to perform the causality tests, the 
percentage each category is long was calculated simply by: 
 
categoryin trader Short   andcategory in trader  Long  Where
 



cc
cc
c
category
SL
SL
L
longPercentage
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and KPSS tests were applied to the aggregated and disaggregated COT 
time series and associated commodity prices. Both the ADF test and the KPSS determine whether there is a unit root 
present in an autoregressive model.  Results from these tests are shown in table 5.1 in the Appendix. 
 
The disaggregated data were evaluated to see whether changes in holdings among certain categories of 
traders can cause prices to change and whether price changes lead certain categories of traders to change their 
positions. A linear vector autoregression (VAR) model was estimated with a number of lags to minimize AIC
4
. A 
Granger test was then conducted for five commodities. Granger (1969) developed this test to determine whether past 
terms contain information that will be useful in forecasting a term that occurs later in a series. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) was proposed by Akaike (1969, 1973, 1974) and is used for measuring the goodness of fit 
for a particular model by balancing the error of the fit against the number of parameters in the model. See pp. 53, Shumway, 
Stoffer (2006). 
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Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) give one explanation of Granger causality or, technically, Granger non-
causality. It is made in a context of models M that contain DGP’s5 capable of generating two sets of variables, Yt 
and Xt. In the definition, Y
t-1
 and X
t-1
 denote the rows of the matrices Y and X, respectively, prior to the t
th. Thus Ωt 
consists of Y
t-1
 and X
t-1
: 
 
Definition: The variables Y
t-1
 do not Granger cause the Xt in a model M containing DGPs characterized by 
contributions if and only if: 
 
   1 ttxtttxt XlXl  
 
In other words, Y
t-1
 does not Granger cause Xt if the distribution of Xt conditional on the past of both Xt 
and Yt is the same as that conditional on the past of Xt alone.  This can be expressed by stating that the past of Yt 
contains no information about Xt that is not already contained in the prior Xt.  For a VAR model, as in this paper, the 
model can be used to test the null hypothesis that one variable does not Granger cause another variable. This 
hypothesis is tested using an F-test.  For the Granger test, this paper tests the relationships from week to week 
(Tuesday to Tuesday), and from Friday, when the COT data is released, to the end of next three trading days (i.e., 
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday). 
 
Further, these relationships will be tested as follows: 
 
For week-to-week: 
 
categorycauseGrangeritycom
itycomcauseGrangercategory
positionsNet Price
PricepositionsNet 
 mod
mod 
 
 
 
 
For COT-release on the next three trading days: 
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INITIAL ANALYSIS OF COT DATA AND THE FUTURES MARKETS 
 
Working’s Speculative Index 
 
The Speculative Index was created for the five commodities evaluated by this study. In addition, the 
Speculative Index was developed for four other highly traded commodities that were included in the calculation. The 
Speculative Index for all the commodities is shown in graph 2.1. Lumber was originally included in the graph, but 
since the market size is very small relative to the other commodities, it was dropped from further analysis. The graph 
is relatively noisy, but one can see which commodities have operated consistently in the top levels of the Speculative 
Index over recent years. Natural Gas and Live Cattle have one of the highest values on this graph. The Speculative 
Index for Natural Gas peaked in the beginning of 2008, while the Live Cattle futures seem to be consistently higher 
on the index than most other commodities. However, the commodity experienced a peak in the index level in 1999 
and at the end of the period under consideration (late 2009). When looking into the COT data set for Natural Gas, it 
                                                          
5 DGP = Data Generating Process. See Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
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seems that the peak in the index in 2008 was caused by a high short position among speculators relative to the 
hedgers. At the time, a little less than 80 percent of the market positions among the speculators were short positions. 
For Live Cattle, the 1999 peak was due to most speculators being long relative to themselves from a temporal setting 
and to the commercials in a contemporary setting. The recent increase in the index simply reflects a relatively high 
level of non-commercial traders active in the Live Cattle market. 
 
Table 2.1 Workings Speculative T, Ranges in Index Values 1995 -2009 for Aggregate Commitments of Traders Data 
Futures 
market Sugar 
Soy 
beans 
Natural 
gas 
Live 
Cattle Coffee Copper Gold 
Crude 
Oil Corn 
Ranges 
(1.01 - 
1.33) 
(1.02 - 
1.31) 
(1.00 - 
1.41) 
(1.03 - 
1.43) 
(1.01 - 
1.34) 
(1.01 - 
1.41) 
(1.01 - 
1.40) 
(1.00 - 
1.18) 
(1.01 - 
1.28) 
Note: Range of Values for Working Speculative T in the data set this paper is looking at (1995–2009) 
 
In the review of the study by Sanders, Irwin, and Merrin (2008) noted earlier in this paper, it is possible to 
compare the historical values for the speculative index with these values over the last 15 years. The authors provide 
values for several agricultural futures markets through six decades for some commodities. Among these markets are 
Corn, Soy Beans, and Live Cattle. Upon comparing the range from Table 2.1, none of these commodities appear to 
be far outside the historical averages. Rather, the levels today seem to be lower than averages that prevailed in the 
past. 
 
Trends in Market Activity 
 
Consistent with general observations on the broad futures markets, commodity futures markets have seen a 
significant growth during the last 15 years. The volume and open interest for all the commodities considered in the 
present study have experienced this consistent trend. Graphs 1.1–1.5 illustrate the increase in volume, open interest, 
price, and speculative index for the five commodities. The first trend that appears obvious across all five future 
markets is the surge in volume and open interest for the commodities between early 2005 and the beginning of 2007. 
In Corn, for example, both open interest and volume grew by around 250 percent in this period, and other 
agricultural commodities such as Coffee showed the same trend. Live Cattle also showed increasing volume and 
open interest in the same period, but this continued in 2009, even though the Live Cattle price has decreased over 
recent years. For Natural Gas and Copper there has also been a significant growth in both open interest and volume 
in 2009. 
 
Position Changes in Trader Categories 
 
The percentage long per category for each commodity futures market is shown in Figures 3.1–3.5 in the 
appendix. Disaggregated data available from June 2006 are used for the graphs and Table 3.2 below, which shows 
the summary statistics for these data. 
 
The results show that all five futures markets have significant differences in the breakdown of different 
trader categories. In markets such as the Live Cattle and Coffee futures markets, the producers are consistently short 
over the period this data covers. In the same markets, it appears that swap dealers are consistently long. Money 
Managers appear to be the category that changes positions the most through the time period. Money Managers have 
been both very short and very long over this period in the Coffee and Copper futures market. For the non-
commercial category, they are acting more like the Money Manager category in the Coffee and Copper markets, 
where the category has a relatively wide range of percentage long. For the rest of the markets, the non-commercials 
appear to be performing more like the producer category. 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics for the Percentage which each Trader Category is Long in the Respective Futures Market 
 Corn Natural Gas Live Cattle Copper Coffee 
 Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range Mean S.D. Range 
% 
long 
prod 32.4 5.0 
(20.8 - 
45.0) 50.0 4.9 
(43.2 - 
61.5) 20.6 5.1 
(10.5 - 
32.4) 30.2 11.6 
(5.1 - 
49.7) 28.7 8.3 
(11.3 - 
45.8) 
% 
long 
swap 97.1 3.3 
(88.8-
100) 64.7 20.3 
(30.9-
95.2) 96.4 1.5 
(91.2-
98.4) 76.9 7.4 
(57.0 - 
91.3) 92.2 6.7 
(77.0 - 
100) 
% 
long 
MM 78.7 13.7 
(45-
98.7) 38.5 11.4 
(19.6 - 
65.0) 67.7 10.6 
(49.4 - 
89.1) 42.2 16.8 
(10.1 - 
73.0) 62.4 18.9 
(28.1 - 
90.2) 
% 
long 
non 38.7 3.6 
(26.8 - 
45.1) 65.9 2.6 
(59.0 - 
73.5) 30.8 3.5 
(23.1 - 
40.5) 47.6 4.4 
(37.1-
57.7) 58.6 5.7 
(39.8-
70.1) 
The data is from the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders report starting in June 2006 until the end of 2009. 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Correlations between Variables 
 
The correlation coefficients from the percentage long per category for each of the five markets are shown in 
Table 4.1 in the appendix. The results add to the graphs in the last section and reveal how the different categories 
react relative to each other and relative to the price of the commodity. 
 
For the correlations between the different trader categories and the futures price of the commodity, there 
are differences between the various commodities. However, in general, the Producer category seems to move against 
the market (i.e., producers increase their long positions when prices are falling), a result that is consistent with 
previous research. The results also show that participants within the Money Manager category favor momentum-
based strategies, in that they increase their long positions when commodity prices increase. The correlation between 
these two categories shows a very strong negative relationship between the net positions for the different categories. 
In other words, speculators often take the opposite side of the producers in trades. This is consistent with a common 
assumption in theoretical and empirical research. The Swap Dealers’ positions in the different markets are more 
mixed. One might expect this category to exhibit a strong negative correlation with the Money Managers, since 
these might be the most likely counterparts for the Swap Dealers when trying to hedge the risk. However, for the 
Corn and Live Cattle futures market, it appears that Producers are the counterparts in the swap trades. Moreover, a 
very weak correlation between Swap Dealers in Corn and Live Cattle markets is also due to the fact that Swap 
Dealers are consistently long on these two commodities, which makes a simple correlation coefficient measurement 
inaccurate. For the Non-commercial and Other reporting traders categories, there is no consistent relationship 
between how the traders change their net positions relative to price and the other categories. One reason for this 
could be that these groups are very diverse and contain both traders with speculating objectives and traders with 
hedging objectives. For non-reporting traders, the results from this simple correlation matrix might indicate that the 
non-reporting traders act more like the Producers in the way that they increase their net positions as price goes down 
(with the exception of non-commercial traders in the Corn futures market). In the Live Cattle futures market, it 
appears that the non-commercial traders change their long positions in the same direction as producers (the 
correlation between the Non-reporting and the Producer net positions had a high positive correlation), while for the 
Copper and Coffee futures, the Non-reporting traders tend to take the same direction as the Money Managers. The 
correlation charts and the summary statistics data from Table 3.2 give the clear impression that the label “small 
speculators” for the non-reporting category is not always appropriate for all futures commodities. Rather, it appears 
that the non-commercial group is acting more like large hedgers in some commodities and more like large 
speculators in other futures markets. However, this could also imply that the Non-reporting category might try to 
mimic the Producers. 
 
Results from Granger Causality Tests and Interpretations 
 
The results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the KPSS test are shown in Table 5.1 in the 
appendix. Even though many of the level time series seem to be non-stationary, it helps to take the first differences 
of most of the time series. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
1390 Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 2013 The Clute Institute 
The results of the first Granger causality tests, which show the change in net positions from week-to-week, 
are in Table 6.1 in the appendix. The analysis of the results from these data yields two conclusions. First, as pointed 
out in earlier research, there is a tendency among the non-reporting trader category to adjust net position to the 
changes in price. For all markets but one, the null hypothesis for Granger non-causality could be rejected on a 95 
percent confidence interval. When looking at the Coffee futures market, it appears that changes in price Granger 
cause producers, money managers, and non-reporting traders to change their positions. 
 
The Live Cattle futures market is the only market where it seems that the week-to-week change in net 
positions may Granger cause a price change. Both the Producers and the Speculators changing their net positions 
appear to Granger cause this change in price. This is an interesting finding, since it could imply that these categories 
have strong influence in the Live Cattle futures market. Other articles, such as Chiarella and Röthig (2007), also 
found the Live Cattle price market to have different characteristics when applying it with price in a linear VAR 
model. However, the authors in this article go further, to find nonlinearities in changes in holdings on price changes 
in several futures markets. 
 
The results from the second Granger test (whether changes in percent long in a category can affect the price 
change from when the data is released and the next three days) are found in Table 7.1. The results suggest that from 
the VAR model, it is not possible to find many causal relationships between categorical changes in holdings and 
changes in price during the days following the release of the COT data. There were some significant relationships in 
these results. For the swap dealers in the Copper market, and for Money Managers in Natural Gas, both have 
significant values for the day after the release of the COT data. There is also a weak Granger causality between 
Producers’ holdings and price changes in the Coffee futures market on the first day. This might imply that there is 
some information in the Commitments of Traders data, as suggested by Wang (2003). This study cannot rule out 
that profitable trading strategies exist. That most of the relationships found are in the “old” commercials category 
also supports previous research suggesting that the commercial group in the aggregate data has an information 
advantage over the non-commercial categories. 
 
The values are also significant considering that a change in Swap Dealers’ holdings Granger cause the price 
change in the Corn futures market three days after the release of the COT data. However, since there is no causality 
between the one- and two-day return and changes in holdings among this category, this finding is very difficult to 
interpret. 
 
Last, it is important to note that since the disaggregated data covers a significantly shorter time period than 
the coverage of aggregate Commitments of Trader data, the strength and applicability of the conclusions are 
diminished. It will be interesting to see whether more time and data could expand upon the results found in the 
immediate study. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study tests Granger causalities for commodities in different markets that both did and did not 
experience spikes in futures prices between 2005 and 2008. More specifically, the study observes speculative levels 
and their predictability from the Commitments of Trader (COT) data. The study finds that there is a tendency to herd 
in several commodity markets, which is consistent with previous research. It also appears that large traders and 
hedgers have more influence in certain commodity futures. One example is the Live Cattle market. The study further 
tests whether the COT data has any predictive power after it is released. Very limited evidence is found that the 
recent Disaggregated COT data has any predictive power. In some commodities, it seems that changes in Swap 
Dealers’ and Producers’ positions can Granger cause the prices to change. However, this is not consistent through 
the different commodities. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Summary Data for the Corn Futures Prices, Volume, Open Interest, and Working’s Speculative Index 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Summary Data for the Natural Gas Futures Prices, Volume, Open Interest, and Working’s Speculative Index 
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Figure 1.3 Summary Data for the Copper Futures Prices, Volume, Open Interest, and Working’s Speculative Index 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Summary Data for the Live Cattle Futures Prices, Volume, Open Interest, and Working’s Speculative Index 
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Figure 1.5 Summary Data for the Coffee Futures Prices, Volume, Open Interest, and Working’s Speculative Index 
 
 
Figure 2.1(a) Working’s Speculative Index for 10 Commodities from 1995–2009 
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Figure 2.1(b) Working’s Speculative Index for 10 Commodities from 1995–2009 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Breakdown of the Percentage Long for each Category for the Corn Futures Market 
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Figure 3.2 Breakdown of the Percentage Long for each Category for the Natural Gas Futures Market 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Breakdown of the Percentage Long for each Category for the Live Cattle Futures Market 
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Figure 3.4 Breakdown of the Percentage Long for each Category for the Copper Futures Market 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Breakdown of the Percentage Long for each Category for the Coffee Futures Market 
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% Long correlation charts 
 
Corn futures   Corn price Prod./Merchant 
Swap 
Dealer 
Money 
Manager 
Non-
reportable 
Category Type  Hedge Hedge Speculate ? 
Corn price 
Monday   1.00     
Prod./Merchant Hedge -0.48 1.00    
Swap Dealer Hedge -0.12 -0.55 1.00   
Money Manager Speculate 0.51 -0.82 0.42 1.00  
Non-reportable ? 0.19 0.08 0.17 -0.11 1.00 
Natural gas 
futures   
Natural gas 
price Prod./Merchant 
Swap 
Dealer 
Money 
Manager 
Non-
reportable 
Category Type  Hedge Hedge Speculate ? 
NG price Monday   1.00     
Prod./Merchant Hedge 0.28 1.00    
Swap Dealer Hedge 0.91 0.53 1.00   
Money Manager Speculate -0.88 -0.52 -0.95 1.00  
Non-reportable ? 0.09 0.15 0.16 -0.16 1.00 
Live Cattle 
futures   
Live Cattle 
price Prod./Merchant 
Swap 
Dealer 
Money 
Manager 
Non-
reportable 
Category Type  Hedge Hedge Speculate ? 
NG price Monday   1.00     
Prod./Merchant Hedge 0.38 1.00    
Swap Dealer Hedge -0.31 0.27 1.00   
Money Manager Speculate -0.73 -0.48 0.32 1.00  
Non-reportable ? 0.22 0.62 0.16 -0.23 1.00 
Copper futures   Copper price Prod./Merchant 
Swap 
Dealer 
Money 
Manager 
Non-
reportable 
Category Type  Hedge Hedge Speculate ? 
NG price Monday   1.00     
Prod./Merchant Hedge -0.36 1.00    
Swap Dealer Hedge 0.10 -0.24 1.00   
Money Manager Speculate 0.14 -0.58 -0.53 1.00  
Non-reportable ? -0.19 -0.57 0.16 0.28 1.00 
Coffee futures   Coffee price Prod./Merchant 
Swap 
Dealer 
Money 
Manager 
Non-
reportable 
Category Type  Hedge Hedge Speculate ? 
NG price Monday   1.00     
Prod./Merchant Hedge -0.40 1.00    
Swap Dealer Hedge -0.51 0.02 1.00   
Money Manager Speculate 0.54 -0.88 -0.25 1.00  
Non-reportable ? -0.15 -0.48 0.38 0.36 1.00 
Figure 4.1 Correlation Chart (Percentage Long per Category) for the Five Futures Markets  
The data set used is the disaggregate data 2006–2009 
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Table 5.1 Dickey-Fuller Test for Commodity Futures Prices and Percentage Holdings per Category 
 Corn price Natural gas Natural gas 
Category Base 1st difference Base 1st difference Base 1st difference 
Corn price -0.481 -6.861 -1.548 -6.130 -1.548 -6.130 
  0.669 0.072 3.117 0.073 3.117 0.073 
Prod./Merchant -0.593 -6.906 -1.329 -7.383 -1.329 -7.383 
  1.012 0.081 1.244 0.251 1.244 0.251 
Swap Dealer -0.153 -7.260 -1.689 -3.946 -1.689 -3.946 
  1.716 0.013 3.507 0.118 3.507 0.118 
Money Manager -0.015 -7.042 0.805 -7.423 0.805 -7.423 
  0.614 0.208 2.948 0.085 2.948 0.085 
Non-reportable -1.105 -6.788 -0.103 -10.485 -0.103 -10.485 
  1.349 0.235 0.536 0.024 0.536 0.024 
 Copper Coffee    
Category Base 1st difference Base 1st difference    
Copper price -0.334 -8.663 -0.438 -9.078    
  1.383 0.941 1.866 0.356    
Prod./Merchant 0.096 -9.893 -0.486 -7.677    
  1.985 0.758 0.357 0.101    
Swap Dealer -1.521 -9.504 1.111 -7.765    
  1.577 0.197 2.836 0.120    
Money Manager -0.425 -11.312 -0.763 -7.191    
  0.212 0.067 0.805 0.047    
Non-reportable -0.102 -9.986 -0.233 -8.623    
  0.728 0.219 1.275 0.046    
ADF Test: Critical Values for Test Statistics: 
 1pct 5pct 10pct  
critical values -2.58 -1.95 -1.62  
H0: Series has a Unit Root 
     
KPSS Test: Critical Values for Test Statistics 
 10pct 5pct 2.5pct 1pct 
critical values 0.347 0.463 0.574 0.739 
H0: Series has no Unit Root 
 
Table 6.1 Granger Test for the Price Change and the Change in Net Position between the COT Reports 
The observations go weekly Tuesday–Tuesday 
Analysis of the Disaggregated Commitment of Traders Data: 
Granger Causality Test (for "Granger Causality" from Tuesday-Tuesday)* 
N = No Granger Causality, Y = Granger Causality, (p-value)     
 Producer/Merchant Swap Dealer Money Manager Non-reporting 
  
∆pos →  
∆p 
∆p → 
∆pos 
∆pos → 
∆p 
∆p → 
∆pos 
∆pos → 
∆p 
∆p → 
∆pos 
∆pos → 
∆p 
∆p → 
∆pos 
Natural gas         
Immediately N N N N N N N N 
(Last Tue - Tue) (0.623) (0.839) (0.076) (0.407) (0.523) (0.806) (0.698) (0.471) 
Corn         
Immediately N N N Y N N N Y 
(Last Tue – Tue) (0.363) (0.470) (0.397) (0.000) (0.298) (0.808) (0.592) (0.000) 
         
Live Cattle Y N N N Y N N N 
(Last Tue – Tue) (0.032) (0.161) (0.184) (0.435) (0.025) (0.337) (0.761) (0.729) 
Copper         
Immediately N Y N N N N N Y 
(Last Tue – Tue) (0.096) (0.036) (0.636) (0.518) (0.178) (0.263) (0.883) (0.014) 
Coffee         
Immediately N Y N N N Y N Y 
(Last Tue – Tue) (0.174) (0.001) (0.474) (0.767) (0.081) (0.000) (0.584) (0.007) 
*(From estimating a VAR-model after AIC criteria) 
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Table 7.1 Granger Test for Change in Price and Percentage Long Holdings per Category for each Commodity Futures Market 
Analysis of the Disaggregate Commitments of Traders Data:  
Granger Causality Test (for “Granger Causality” on Day 1,2 and 3 after Data Released)* 
N = No Granger Causality, Y = Granger Causality, (p-value)      
Commodity 
Producer/ 
Merchant Swap Dealer 
Money 
Manager Non-reporting  
Producer/ 
Merchant Swap Dealer 
Money 
Manager Non-reporting 
 ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p  ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p ∆%long -> ∆p 
Natural gas     Corn     
3 days after N N N N 3 days after N Y N N 
(Fri-Wed) (0.867) (0.240) (0.804) (0.372) (Fri-Wed) (0.225) (0.011) (0.475) (0.664) 
2 days after N N N N 2 days after N N N N 
(Fri-Tue) (0.491) (0.207) (0.623) (0.365) (Fri-Tue) (0.737) (0.207) (0.772) (0.109) 
1 Day 
After release 
N N Y N 
1 Day After 
release 
N N N N 
(Fri–Mon) (0.793) (0.175) (0.037) (0.732) (Fri–Mon) (0.844) (0.895) (0.585) (0.756) 
Live Cattle     Coffee     
3 days after N N N N 3 days after N N N N 
(Fri-Wed) (0.893) (0.139) (0.282) (0.243) (Fri-Wed) (0.183) (0.545) (0.879) (0.938) 
2 days after N N N N 2 days after N N N N 
(Fri-Tue) (0.889) (0.991) (0.343) (0.052) (Fri-Tue) (0.267) (0.960) (0.343) (0.5455) 
1 Day 
After release 
N N N N 
1 Day After 
release 
N N N N 
(Fri–Mon) (0.330) (0.831) (0.449) (0.878) (Fri–Mon) (0.068) (0.895) (0.448) (0.650) 
Copper          
3 days after N N N N      
(Fri-Wed) (0.956) (0.547) (0.165) (0.664)      
2 days after N N N N      
(Fri-Tue) (0.593) (0.236) (0.137) (0.702)      
1 Day After 
release N Y N N      
(Fri–Mon) (0.664) (0.043) (0.830) (0.586)      
*(From estimating a VAR-model after AIC criteria) 
